Famine

In August, 2025, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) disseminated the Famine Review Committee’s report on Gaza, concluding that, “The Famine Review Committee (FRC) has determined that Famine (IPC Phase 5) is currently occurring in Gaza Governorate. Furthermore, the FRC projects Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds to be crossed in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis Governorates in the coming weeks.” The report highlighted that “this famine is entirely man-made,” criticizing “Israeli authorities” for denying or limiting aid into Gaza. The report garnered significant scrutiny, with several individuals arguing:

1. Skewed Sample Size: Salo Aizenberg explains that the IPC had access to a larger dataset for July, approximately 15,000 children, but instead chose a smaller dataset of 7,000. Aizenberg explains, “IPC tested 15,700 kids for malnutrition in July and found 12%—below 15% famine threshold Problematic. So what did they do? Use a smaller incomplete 7,100 sample showing 16% Solved. Now UN can claim famine in Gaza!” Aizenberg argues that the IPC purposefully used a smaller sample size to manufacture famine statistics. Had the IPC used the correct dataset of 15,000 children, there would have been no famine declaration.

1. UNICEF Data Demonstrates no Famine: The July 2026 “State of Palestine Nutrition Cluster Coordination Meeting” reports that malnutrition levels in Gaza remain below famine-level. The data explains, “Acute malnutrition remains low, but screening must continue … WHZ is low across all domains, suggesting no widespread acute malnutrition at population level.”

Mass Death Linked to Famine did not Occur: Aizenberg states, “The IPC declaration of famine on Aug. 22 would have predicted about 10,000 starvation deaths through the Oct. 10 ceasefire … However, data from Hamas and the United Nations show that 192 malnutrition-related deaths occurred from the time of the famine claim until the ceasefire.”

1. MUAC Data Undermines the IPC's Famine Determination: Mike Wagenheim reports that the IPC relied on “a two-week data sample from mid-to-late July,” which provided that “15% of children sampled show signs of malnutrition.” These findings were used to determine that “famine was already taking place” despite “The newer information, released on Sept. 17 by the ‘State of Palestine’ Nutrition Cluster, reveals that IPC-standard age-weighted MUAC data—as opposed to the unweighted data in the IPC’s famine report—did not meet the IPC’s own famine criteria [15%]. And without MUAC data showing famine levels, it becomes impossible for the IPC to extrapolate famine-level deaths.” JNS explains, “The Global Nutrition Cluster’s Sept. 17 data release, though, shows the age-weighted MUAC-focused mean malnutrition rate in the Gaza City area to be approximately 14.8% in the second half of July before falling substantially in August back to rates previously seen in June. That 14.8% measurement falls below the 15% necessary to meet famine criteria, and significantly below the 16.2% unweighted mean. At no point, according to the Palestinian Authority data, did the MUAC rate cross 15% before it began to decline substantially in August back toward the 10.5% to 11% rate it hit in June.” The new MUAC data undermines the IPC’s claim of famine and demonstrates that, by the IPC standards, there was never a famine in Gaza.
2. Limitations of MUAC as a Famine Indicator: Mike Wagenheim explains that “In determining acute malnutrition among children under the age of five, the IPC relies on a measurement of the circumference of the mid-upper arm (MUAC), as opposed to the more reliable weight-for-height score.” Wagenheim argues that, “In pre-war Gaza, the prevalence of MUAC was significantly higher than that of weight-for-height rates (which is the reverse of what usually occurs). Thus, the lower MUAC threshold for determining a food-related emergency should have been viewed as less relevant due to this pre-war anomaly among Gaza’s children.” Wagenheim maintains that by failing to account for this discrepancy, namely the lower MUAC before the war, the IPC overstated the prevalence of acute hunger.
3. SMART Survey Finds Acute Malnutrition at Acceptable Levels: The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification reported that the 2026 Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) survey indicates that acute malnutrition in Gaza has declined significantly, contradicting claims that there is a famine in Gaza. Specially, the SMART survey details, “(SMART) survey data, collected from 31 May to 15 June 2026, indicates that Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) decreased to IPC AMN Phase 1 (Acceptable). This significant improvement compared to the previous IPC analysis is driven by a marked scale-up of nutrition prevention programmes—notably Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programmes (BSFP) for children aged 6–59 months—alongside increased access to acute malnutrition treatment and other essential health services. In May 2026, BSFP coverage reached around 60 percent of the target, an increase from July-September 2025, when programme coverage was extremely low.”
4. Skewed Estimates: HonestReporting argues that the IPC’s estimates are skewed because “The report relies heavily on hospital records, which skews the results due to the focus on sicker children and the exclusion of healthy children. This is why the IPC generally does not use hospital records in determining acute malnutrition but relies on community-based records. By mainly relying on hospital records, the IPC has acted in contravention of its own guidelines.”

Shortly after the ICP’s declaration that there was a “famine” in Gaza, Callum Sutherland reported, “Global leaders and humanitarian groups have said Gaza is facing “a new phase of hell” after a newly-published report from The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) concluded famine is taking place in Gaza City. It marks the first time that famine has been confirmed since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.” The article disregards contradicting claims, including:

1. The IPC Lowered the Famine Threshold: Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains, “The IPC changed its own global standard, cutting the 30% threshold to 15% for this report.” The IPC uses a 30% famine threshold when malnutrition is measured by Weight-for-Height Z-score (WHZ), but a 15% famine threshold when relying on Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC). Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues that “MUAC prevalence ratio in the Middle East is about 1.3, not 1.9, implying a famine cut-off closer to 23%.” The IPC uses a lower threshold (15%) to declare famine, whereas the MUAC in the Middle East requires a higher threshold (23%) to meet the famine threshold.
2. Documented Humanitarian Aid to Gaza: The coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) oversees the coordination of humanitarian aid entering Gaza. Their report explains, “The entry of food into the Gaza Strip is nearly threefold the requirements defined by the World Food Program (WFP). Between October 2025 and 7 June 2026, approximately 1.78 million tons of food entered the Gaza Strip. These quantities substantially exceed every humanitarian food requirement benchmark published by WFP concerning Gaza. In July 2025, the WFP asserted that approximately 62,000 metric tons (MT) of food per month were required to meet Gaza's humanitarian needs. In November 2025, following the ceasefire, WFP revised this benchmark further upward to 80,000 MT per month.”
3. Factors Affecting Civilian Access to Food: While organizations argue Israel is responsible for manufacturing a famine in Gaza, COGAT reports, “The primary challenges to food availability and affordability are not related to the volume of aid entering Gaza but to its management, taxation, and circulation in the Hamas-controlled areas of the Gaza Strip. Reports of large food stockpiles alongside documented cases of spoiled and destroyed food suggest significant inefficiencies in storage and distribution. At the same time, Hamas's taxation and control over the circulation of goods, as well as merchant cartels and price fixing, continue to distort market conditions and affect civilian access to food. Addressing these internal challenges is essential to improving humanitarian outcomes.”
4. Hamas's Commandeering of Aid: NGO Monitor argues that, “Since seizing control of Gaza in 2007, Hamas has employed several methods to divert international humanitarian aid to expand its military infrastructure, pay salaries, and cement its rule.” NGO Monitor explains that Hamas exacerbated hunger by stealing aid and selling the product on the “black market” for significantly more, resulting in a surge in food prices and rendering food unaffordable to many.
5. Legal Limits on Cooperation with Humanitarian Organizations: Joshua Simmons, Department of State attorney, expressed to the UN General Assembly that "There is no legal requirement that an occupying power permit a specific third State or international organization to conduct activities in occupied territory that would compromise its security interests." These comments arise from increased scrutiny over Israel’s

reluctance to work with UNRWA to facilitate aid into Gaza.